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NOTES

phy of the Burger Court-if it makes good sense, it makes good law.
Since the Court bases its holding primarily on personal assumptions
about human nature (sense rather than fact or stare decisis), the
observer finds himself wondering what cases and data the Court
might have considered. The only comfort to be found is in the fact
that there really was not much new in Janis since the erosion of the
exclusionary rule had begun several years earlier. The limited effect
of this ruling is yet to be seen vis-a-vis law enforcement and the IRS.
However it certainly exemplifies the apparent willingness of the
present Court to tamper with Constitutional safeguards without
giving the potential effect of its ruling a full and fair hearing.
ELLEN CATSMAN FREIDIN

Proprietary Powers: A New Policy Tool for the

States?
The Supreme Court of the United States held that a state
plan under which a bounty was paid to scrap metal processorsfor
the processing of automobile hulks was an exercise of the state's
proprietarypower and not subject to the restrictions of the commerce clause. By so holding the Court avoided the need to balance state interests against the burden placed by the plan upon
interstate commerce. This article discusses the effect of the
Court's decision not to apply the balancing test and argues that
state actions of this type should not be shielded from commerce
clause scrutiny.
Alexandria Scrap Corporation, a Virginia scrap processor,
brought an action challenging the constitutionality of a statutory
scheme' through which Maryland, in an effort to protect its environment, sought to accelerate the rate at which old automobile hulks
were destroyed. By offering a bounty for the destruction of such
hulks, Maryland hoped to bring about an increase in the destruction
rate. Under an amended version of the plan, domestic scrap processors were allowed to recover the bounty upon filing of proof that the
1. The law, as amended, is set forth at 6 MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2, § 5-201 to 210. (Cum.
Supp. 1976).
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car was destroyed and upon filing with the state an indemnity agreement between the party supplying the hulk and the processor. Foreign (out of state) processors were required, under the scheme, to
file proof of title to the hulk.' The requirement that foreign processors file proof of title instead of an indemnity agreement placed
before them a difficult hurdle not faced by Maryland processors.
Before a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland, Alexandria Scrap argued that the plan
was repugnant to the commerce clause and denied foreign processors equal protection of the laws. 3 The district court, finding for
Alexandria Scrap on both of these grounds, enjoined appellants,
officials of the State of Maryland, from continuing to allow only to
Maryland processors the right to claim the bounty on the basis of
an indemnity agreement. 4 On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court held, reversed: A statutory scheme for the protection of the
environment which provides for the payment of a bounty to scrap
processors for the destruction of hulks formerly titled in state and
which makes it substantially more difficult for foreign processors to
claim bounties under the scheme is not violative of the commerce
clause as the state is merely exercising its proprietary powers in
order to bid up the price of hulks, and the commerce clause was not
intended to restrict the state in its exercise of its proprietary powers.
The plan does not deny foreign processors equal protection of the
laws as the scheme impinges upon no fundamental interest, and
there is a rational relationship between the statutory means chosen
2. The Maryland statutory scheme, as originally enacted, allowed both foreign and domestic processors of scrap steel to collect a bounty for the destruction of a hulk without any
proof of title. 6 MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2, § 11-1002.2(f)(5) (1957). In 1974, § 11-1002.2(f)(5)
was amended to require that domestic processors submit a copy of an indemnity agreement
between the processor and the party supplying the hulk. Foreign processors wishing to claim
under the bounty provisions would be required to submit proof of title. 6 MD. ANN. CODE art.
66 1/2, § 11-1002.2(f)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
3. Under the initial version of the plan, Maryland would pay a bounty to any scrap
processor who destroyed a hulk formerly registered in Maryland. It was anticipated that the
processors would pass a portion of the bounty along to their suppliers. The effect of the bounty
system was, as anticipated, to increase the supply of hulks to processors and to accelerate
the rate at which hulks were destroyed. Under the amended plan, bounties would still be paid
to both foreign and domestic processors. However, because it was often difficult for the
suppliers of hulks to produce the proofs required by Maryland of foreign processors in order
to collect the bounty, the suppliers often took their hulks to Maryland processors. Plaintiffappellee, the third largest processor of hulks under the pre-1974 plan, suffered a dramatic
shrinkage in his supply of Maryland titled hulks after the effective date of the amended plan.
4. Alexandria Scrap Corp. v. Hughes, 391 F. Supp. 46 (D. Md. 1975).
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by the legislature and the policy goals sought. Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 96 S.Ct. 2488 (1976).1
The Supreme Court has historically viewed the commerce
clause as a limitation upon the states' power to enact legislation
affecting interstate commerce. The Court has sought to prevent the
states from erecting barriers "to the free flow of both raw materials
and finished goods in response to the economic laws of supply and
demand." 6 It has forbidden the states to enact legislation for the
purpose of,7 or which has the practical effect of, discriminating
against interstate commerce.8 The Court has also struck down laws
which burden interstate commerce even though they do not discriminate against it.9 Statutes which have the practical effect of requiring a foreign business to relocate in the regulating state have incurred special disfavor. 0 The Court's determined effort in this area
derives its impetus from concerns of great historical significance.
The existence, under the Articles of Confederation, of extensive
barriers to trade among the states was a major factor in the calling
of the Annapolis and Philadelphia Conventions." Since the establishment of the Constitution, and in furtherance of the federalist
principles set forth therein, the Court has sought to insure that state
lines do not become barriers to the free flow of trade. 2
Though the Court has been concerned about the impact of state
policies on interstate commerce, not all state policies which impinge
on interstate commerce have been struck down. The Court has recognized the states' broad police power to enact legislation to promote the safety and welfare of their people. Legislation designed to
5. This note will focus on the commerce clause aspects of the case and will not examine
the equal protection issues raised.
6. 96 S. Ct. at 2494.
7. E.g., Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964); H.P. Hood
& Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940);
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist.,
120 U.S. 489 (1887).
8. E.g., Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 (1939); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U.S.'511 (1935); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
9. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890).
10. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385
(1948); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
11. Bane, Interstate Trade Barriers-GeneralIntroduction, 116 IND. L.J. 121, 122 (1940).
12. For an effective discussion of the historical objectives of the policy, see Justice Jackson's majority opinion in H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. at 539. The Court's
concern with the possible divisive and damaging effect of competitive protectionism is powerfully expressed by Justice Cardozo in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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protect such basic interests has often received the blessings of the
Court even though the legislation has had an adverse impact on
interstate commerce. 3 In such instances the Court has applied a
"balancing test" in which it has attempted to balance the importance of the state act in promoting the safety and well-being of state
citizens against the burden the act imposes on the free flow of commerce.' In these attempts the Court has been particularly influenced by the existence of less burdensome alternative methods to
achieve the states' goals. Where such alternative methods exist,
burdensome state-policies fail even where the state is acting in an
area of legitimate state concern."
While the commerce clause has been interpreted as a limitation
upon a state's governmental power to discriminate against or otherwise burden interstate commerce, there is no decision of the Court
which places commerce clause limitations on a state in the exercise
of its proprietary powers. 6 When exercising these powers, a state is
to be treated as a private individual, specifically, as a private
businessman;" hence the constitutional limits ordinarily imposed
on state action are inapplicable. It is important to note that past
decisions recognizing the proprietary powers of government have
involved instances where the government has been in the process of
procuring some good necessary to the performance of its governmental function. 9 These cases have not involved state policies intended
13. E.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933); Bradley v. Public Utils. Comm., 289 U.S. 92 (1933); Crossman v.
Lurman, 192 U.S. 189 (1904).
14. Great A & P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137 (1970); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Bibb
v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340
U.S. 349 (1951); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
15. Great A & P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137 (1970); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
16. The Court did summarily affirm a lower court decision to the effect that states were
not limited by the commerce clause while exercising their proprietary powers. American
Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
17. Id. at 721.
18. E.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S.
175 (1915); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
19. E.g., Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903) dealt with the conviction of a government
contractor for violating a state law making it illegal for a contractor to employ men working
on a government construction contract for more than eight hours a day. Heim v. McCall, 239
U.S. 175 (1915) involved a New York statute requiring that New York citizens be hired on
state construction projects before citizens from other states. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310
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directly to bring about change in general economic or social conditions. In this regard Hughes is a departure from past decisions.
The Hughes decision turns on the Court's characterization of
Maryland's statutory scheme to rid its environment of automobile
hulks by offering a bounty to the scrap industry for the processing
of such hulks. The application of the label "purchase of goods" to
this attempt by the state to speed up the "scrap cycle" determines
the outcome of the case. The Court reasons that Maryland has
merely entered the market to bid up the price of hulks so that towers
and owners of hulks will be more willing to supply hulks to scrap
processors. In effect, Maryland is purchasing the processing of
hulks. This kind of entry into the market by the state, as an exercise
of its proprietary powers, is not "a burden which the Commerce
Clause was intended to make suspect." 20 The commerce clause, the
Court tells us, was designed to protect against embargoes or tariffs
established by one state against others. It was not intended to apply
to a state's entry "into the market as a purchaser, in effect, of a
potential article of interstate commerce ... "1 While Maryland's
action does affect the flow of hulks across state lines, the bounty
system does not create a barrier to that flow. We are told that the
hulks stay within Maryland in response to market forces and, we
may infer, not because Maryland has erected a barrier. Since this
was not the type of state action against which the commerce clause
was intended to protect, the Court reversed the district court decision and held that the Maryland plan was not inconsistent with the
commerce clause. Nothing in the commerce clause bars a state from
discriminating inits purchasing policy in favor of its citizens."
In Hughes, the Court significantly expanded the concept of
state proprietary powers. In past decisions, proprietary acts had
involved the actual process of state procurement for governmental
consumption. In these cases the state had been acting in its capacity
as a businessman. 3 In Hughes, the state was attempting to solve a
U.S. 113 (1940) involved a challenge by government contractors of Congress' power to require
that those selling to the federal government pay their employees a minimum wage set by the
Secretary of Labor. The Florida statute involved in American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F.
Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1972) required that the state government let contracts for the printing
of a certain class of books only to firms who would do the printing in Florida.
20. 96 S.Ct. at 2496.
21. Id. at 2497.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2496.
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problem affecting the public welfare. In exercise, therefore, of its
police powers, the state offered incentives which it hoped would lead
to a change in the behavior of certain economic sectors. At no time
was the state acting in its capacity as a businessman, seeking to
procure goods for consumption in the process of governing. The
description of such activity as "proprietary" is a major expansion
of the concept.
The Court states that Maryland's action is not the kind of
burden which the commerce clause was intended to make suspect.
Yet discriminatory purchasing policies have long been regarded as
important impediments to trade.2 4 Maryland's particular policy is
likely to have a greater impact within the economic sector affected
than most such purchasing policies. Since the Maryland scheme
makes it more difficult for foreign processors to collect the bounty
it has many of the attributes of a subsidy to Maryland scrap processors. Maryland's policy is designed to alter market forces in favor
of domestic processors. Its effect is to put foreign competitors at a
disadvantage as, other things being equal, domestic firms will be
able to buy at higher prices and sell at lower prices without sacrificing profits. Discriminatory taxes which do not bar foreign firms from
the market but do place the firms at a competitive disadvantage
have been struck down consistently.2 5 A discriminatory subsidy program clearly can put foreign firms at a disadvantage and can lead
to the kind of competitive escalation against which the Court has
fought for so long.24 Since statutory schemes such as Maryland's in
the instant case can promote precisely those kinds of discriminatory
problems the commerce clause has been interpreted as prohibiting,
characterization of such schemes as an exercise of proprietary powers which are not subject to commerce clause restraint may give rise
to future difficulties of interpretation.
However, as the Court has chosen to designate Maryland's
bounty plan an exercise of the state's proprietary powers, a question
may still be raised as to why the Court has indicated that in approving such plans it will not even balance the competing interests of
24. Melder, The Economics of Trade Barriers, 16 IND. L.J. 127, 139-41 (1940).
25. E.g., Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Best &
Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489
(1887).
26. E.g., Great A & P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc.
v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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nation and state. The balancing test has hitherto involved the Court
in making fine decisions of economic policy, and the Court's activism in rooting out discrimination has left the states few economic
tools to effect economic and social policy. In Hughes, the Court may
be indicating that it will allow the state a wide range of discretion
in the use of certain limited policy tools. Positive incentives, such
as bounties and subsidies, might be attractive to the Court since
there are built in political limits on the use of gubgidies. After all,
bounty-subsidy money comeg out of the state budget and must compete with other interests. Thus, subsidy programs must contend
with countervailing forces which do not confront discriminatory regulations or taxes. In addition, positive incentives may be felt to be
particularly suited to pursuing goals of social policy as they are often
seen as being less coercive, and hence less likely to arouse political
opposition.
By labeling the Maryland statutory scheme an exercise of its
proprietary powers and by holding such an exercise beyond the intended scope of the commerce clause, the Court precluded use of
the balancing test developed under the commerce clause cases.
While it is commendable that the Court may wish to return some
measure of policy discretion to the states, it seems unfortunate that
the Court abandoned the option to review the economic impact of
policies such as Maryland's. Such policies can be disruptive of trade
and can lead to competitive retaliation. It would seem that the
"balancing test" developed under the commerce clause cases could
also be effective in reviewing state attempts to further public welfare through exercise of state proprietary powers. The test was designed to give important state interests their appropriate weight.
The Court should not have abandoned the test in Hughes.
RICHARD SURREY

Shutting the Federal Habeas Corpus Door
In a recent decision the Supreme Court has halted the prior
trend of increasing the scope of federal review available to state
prisoners. The case broke with a substantialhistory of decisions
by denying habeas corpus to state prisoners who asserted fourth
amendment violations. The author suggests that the rationaleof

